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FOREWORD
Although the close results of the recent election may yield a weakened administration and a split Congress, some hard decisions will need to be made about the future course of American national security strategy. Everyone agrees that there is a mismatch between current military missions and resources, but opinions about how to fix it vary widely. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have to address all the relevant issues and provide useful recommendations to the new administration as it develops a new security strategy.
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies convened a conference on "Alternative Military Strategies for the United States" to highlight the key issues that will have to be analyzed by the QDR and the new administration's security planning. This report summarizes the presentations from a distinguished group of panelists that included many prominent American commentators on national security issues.
The report closes with an analysis of the most important issues that must be resolved to produce a viable national security strategy for the new millennium. This strategy will require some combination of new mission priorities, additional force structure, and Department of Defense economizing. This report provides a useful overview of the various positions in those areas, and is a good starting point for those trying to grasp the intricacies of future QDR debates.
Introduction .
The U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies, along with its National Security Studies Program, cosponsored a conference in Washington, DC on September 21, 2000, to examine the issues that will shape future American defense policy. Discussion panels were structured to identify the questions, issues, and schisms likely to shape the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. Among the 160 attendees registered for the conference were representatives from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) offices for all the Services and the Joint Staff, as well as defense experts from other government agencies, private industry, and academia.
The conference was divided into four panels. The first session discussed what the focus should be for U.S. defense planners for the next 10 to 20 years. The second looked at the issues involved in transforming the military and Department of Defense (DoD) for that future. The third panel debated how the near-term U.S. defense budget should be allocated for force structure, manpower, and modernization. The last analyzed what the next National Military Strategy should be. This report summarizes the presentations of the main speakers and highlights the myriad issues they illuminated about formulating a future American national security strategy.
Planning Focus.
Alan Goldman opened the first panel with a presentation entitled "Peer Level Threats to U.S. Vital Interests." He lamented the incoherence in current strategic thinking 10 years after the end of the Cold war, resulting primarily from an inability to develop viable forecasts of long-range threats. The world appears less threatening, but is also more uncertain. The spectrum of possible threats ranges from terrorism to weapons of mass destruction, but specifics are hard to discern.
Goldman argued that force planners should instead focus on being able to fight major wars to defend U.S. vital national interests. He listed five, derived from work by the Commission on America's National Interests in 1996. They are:
• Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of NBC attacks on the United States;
• Prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia;
• Prevent the emergence of a hostile power on our borders or in control of the seas;
• Prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems; and,
• Ensure the survival of U.S. allies.
A force designed to safeguard these interests should also deter major threats.
Goldman argued that Americans too easily dismiss the chance of the emergence of a peer competitor, which he defined as a nation or rival coalition capable of dominating Europe or Asia. Also, history is filled with examples of weaker nations dissatisfied with the status quo who attacked stronger ones when it appeared that waiting would only make the strategic imbalance worse. Underestimation of these possibilities increases the potential to be surprised, and traditional American reluctance to bear the costs of superpower status means initial phases of the nation's wars usually involve building up forces recovering from operational or strategic mistakes. That time may not be available in the future, so there is a clear need to have a force always ready to fight major wars to protect vital interests.
Timothy Hoyt agreed that strategic planning needs to remain focused on winning major theater wars (MTWs). Expensive and difficult wars in Asia or the Middle East are still possible, and the most serious threat we face. Hoyt asserted that an American heavy corps remains the most significant military force on the planet, and such forces influence other actors on the international scene through deterrence, conflict limitation, and speedy war termination when they are committed. These capabilities will be even more important if China or Russia emerges as a peer competitor. Maintaining the capability to fight MTWs is critical for broader international stability.
Hoyt pointed out that in the past America has relied on sea barriers, mobilization, technology, and its industrial base to win wars. New weapons take a long time to develop and produce, however, and the industrial base has declined. There will be no time to mobilize and train forces for major conflicts in the 21st century. He admitted that maintaining MTW capability is expensive, but it is cheaper than the costs of war, and the United States might not be able to recreate the ability to fight MTWs if it is allowed to disappear. The British Army never recovered the capability it sacrificed during the period between the World Wars, with disastrous consequences.
Despite these strong arguments for maintaining MTW focus and capability, that is not the most probable type of conflict the nation will face. In his presentation, "The Use of Military Power in Crisis, Conflict and Stability Operations," Ambassador Robert Oakley asserted that future crises will evolve from the rising number of failed states along with developing nations disgruntled that the 20 percent of the world's population in advanced countries uses 86 percent of the planet's resources. Traditional concepts of national security and war have merged with humanitarian concerns and challenges to public order. Seriously troubled states threaten access to vital resources, create troublesome refugee flows, serve as sanctuaries for criminals and terrorists, and become catalysts for regional conflict and instability. Oakley noted that the United States currently expends many billion dollars a year on such countries.
Oakley explained that this changed environment makes questions of when, where, and how to intervene more complex. It requires much more civil-military planning and cooperation, and might necessitate a change in basic military organization. Although the potential for unilateral action exists, the consensus is that future American military operations will be expeditionary, joint, and combined. Oakley argued that the Army needs to follow the lead of the Navy and Air Force to organize into smaller, modular formations. DoD must link better with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies to ensure unity of effort. Military power employed without clear, well-defined, and attainable political objectives will fail. In the long run, the best strategy may be to emphasize the diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian actions necessary to prevent the creation of failed states requiring military intervention.
Robert Steele continued this emphasis on a different approach to force planning with a briefing that considered "Non-traditional Threats." He predicted a future where high intensity conflicts level off, low intensity conflicts increase, and internal political and ethnic violence "goes through the roof." Genocides, water shortages, and AIDS will wrack the world. He described four threat types: high tech brutes fighting conventional wars, low tech brutes engaged in low intensity conflict, high tech seers focused on information warfare, and low tech seers engaged in a jihad. In his opinion, those transformers who think these threats can all be met with a single "Army After Next" based on revolution in military affairs (RMA) technology are out of touch with the future strategic environment. Steele argued that we will need four different types of military forces capable of handling regional conflicts, crime, home defense, and intrastate problems. He believes that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, requiring a focus on thinking people more than complicated technology and a realization that national security begins with "day-to-day good will" from governmental agencies other than DoD. $100 million will buy an aircraft carrier, 1000 potential strategic thinkers, 10,000 Peace Corps volunteers, or a million cubic meters of desalinated water. Force planners in the next administration will have to make appropriate tradeoffs to design the right security instruments to implement their strategy, and Steele believes expensive high technology military forces should not be the highest priority.
Defense Transformation Issues.
The second panel concentrated on how the military services should change to respond to the new threats mentioned in the earlier session, and to take advantage of the technological advances that are affecting the way we fight. James Blaker began by pointing out that there is widespread agreement that warfare is changing. The real debate is over the speed, depth, and drivers of that change, and whether we need to alter our military organizations to embrace a "Revolution in Military Affairs." Blaker believes that we do. He described the key ways he thought that warfare was evolving. In his view, mass armies that fight at close range in sequential phases are being replaced by more agile forces that engage from a distance in concurrent operations. Joint requirements are replacing those of the services, and civilian decisionmakers are increasingly dominant over their military counterparts. He argued that debate and experimentation must be encouraged to make sure that the services have the right type of personnel and organizations by 2010 or 2020 to meet the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities resulting from the RMA.
Michèle Flournoy echoed some of Blaker's points while adding that transformation will also be essential to combat future adversaries applying asymmetric strategies designed to counter or avoid our strengths. For example, she noted, "Access problems are coming to a theater near you." Fiscal pressures will also force DoD to be more efficient. The process of radical change must begin now, since it takes a long time and there is no guarantee that the initial path will be the right one. The goal should be to preserve continued U.S. military superiority against all threats and to ensure American military power can achieve national interests at an acceptable level of risk.
While all the services have accepted the need for change and are pursuing and testing new ideas, Flournoy sees a number of barriers to transformation. There is much complacency about the effort because of the perceived lack of major threats or a challenge to current American military superiority. Today's high operational tempo also detracts from the effort and energy necessary for innovation. Services tend to underestimate the requirements for transformation since there is no good way to measure progress. Additionally, the process is hampered by a zero-defects military culture that discourages experimentation, along with the divisive suspicion of interservice rivalry. And real world threats and operations are always a distraction from any future planning.
Despite these obstacles, Flournoy is convinced that meaningful military transformation should and can be accomplished. She argued that the keys to achieving that goal will be the development of new operational concepts and a rationalization of DoD organizations. She advocated some increased funding for the process, but argued that it is more important to accelerate the pace with command emphasis and cultural changes. After developing a well-defined vision for changing DoD and its components, senior leaders should create a clear roadmap to focus transformation efforts and create a sense of urgency. Service cultures need to be altered to encourage experimen-tation and reward innovation, and a dedicated cadre within them must catalyze and integrate transformation efforts. Flournoy admitted that to make the process work, DoD leaders must also be willing to accept additional risk in meeting near term threats. They will have to perform a complicated balancing act between near, mid, and longer term demands.
The last speaker on the panel, Michael O'Hanlon, was much less sanguine about the chances to achieve significant transformation with the resource constraints that will exist. He noted that the next administration will not be inclined to spend as much on defense as the current strategy demands. Campaign promises of a five or ten billion dollar annual increase for DoD fall far short of the estimated 50 billion dollars required to match capabilities to missions while pursuing modernization and research. Yet overseas commitments will be hard to reduce, since most are in regions of considerable strategic interest and have bipartisan support. Therefore, any transformation efforts will have to be very economical, and compete with procurement, recapitalization and a high tempo of normal operations for defense funds. He also believes that with the current state of technology and doctrinal innovation, wholesale transformation of the services in the next decade does not make sense anyway. He recommended a more modest approach focusing research and development and selective modernization on those electronic, sensor, and munition technologies that have the potential for true revolutionary change. In his view, the services need to invest more in research, while cutting back extensive plans for modernization.
Keynote Address.
One of the highlights of the gathering was the keynote speech by General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. Central Command. He provided his own views on the direction national security should be heading. He focused on two questions coming out of his involvement in the readiness and transformation debates, "Ready for what?" and "What needs to change?" He perceives that there has been a lack of American focus in engagement planning during a period he described as "the third reordering of the world in the twentieth century." He argued that the regional CINCs have not been getting enough resources to adequately shape their theaters. General Zinni also pointed out that with the current complex international political situation comes a rise of new threats like organized crime and failed states that demand new approaches. The United States may need two kinds of military forces, one large and at a high level of readiness prepared to fight two MTWs, and another more flexible to handle less traditional missions. The nation needs to exploit its own asymmetrical advantages in technology, fast response, the ability to expand the battlefield, and information gathering, while at the same time revamping the interagency process and carefully identifying the capabilities each service really needs. He further emphasized that the services need to involve the American people in this process and maintain their confidence in U.S. military competence, so parents will continue to send their sons and daughters to serve the nation in uniform.
Force Structure, Manpower, and Modernization.
Carl Conetta opened the third panel by arguing that the United States could spend significantly less on defense without endangering its security priorities. He stated that DoD could be reduced to 1.2 million uniformed personnel and a budget of $250 billion in today's dollars by 2005. He thinks the nation's policies for the use of military force have become detached from threats and are too ambitious, probably unworkable, and possibly counterproductive. Additionally, DoD has not taken advantage of changes in warfare or new management practices to increase efficiency. He pointed out that 20 percent of the services' base structure is excess, and maintenance depots, testing facilities, schools, and hospitals all operate with significant extra capacity.
Conetta believes that military forces need to return to a focus on the "respond" element of our current "shape, respond, prepare" strategy. In his view shaping and preparing were overemphasized on the last QDR; the first belongs to the State Department, and the United States doesn't need a large active force for the latter. Forward presence could be reduced in favor of strong deterrence. Money could also be saved by admitting that the real advances from a military-technical revolution are in the future, and by avoiding big investments in interim technology, like the F-22, today. He also argued that planners overestimate the requirements for a major theater war against declining rogue states, and could save further resources by dropping the goal of quick victories in multiple wars and adopting a "win-hold-win" approach. But MTWs are far less likely to occur than a host of smaller contingencies. He warned that current American armed forces are in danger of becoming strategically irrelevant for future warfare, and need to adopt modern information-age business practices that favor smaller but more flexible tactical units. Additionally, the services need to better align the needs of operational deployment, unit training, and personnel development by gearing these needs away from global protracted wars and toward the smaller scale contingencies that they are actually doing.
The next presenter, Daniel Gouré, disagreed strongly with Conetta. Gouré opened by asking three questions: Is the United States going to remain engaged in the world? Does it need a spectrum of military capabilities? Does it want to retain its qualitative military edge? He then pointed out that although an affirmative consensus has been reached on all these issues, there is still a $50 billion to $75 billion budget shortfall to pay for the forces required and to maintain the industrial base to support them. Whether fiscal constraints necessitate a cutback in force structure or missions, the current strategic approach cannot be main-tained. DoD has tried and failed for years in attempts to reduce operations and support costs, and older equipment is increasingly expensive to maintain. He argued that the biggest problem is in the procurement of new systems, and that modernizing the entire force will cost $164 billion a year for the next decade. He fears that American military forces are entering a new period of vulnerability, and while transformation is needed, it will not be possible without more money. He advocated a return to spending 4 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product on defense. The country can afford that, and historically has paid even a higher amount to guarantee its security.
The last speaker on this panel, Steven Kosiak, agreed that the budget is insufficient to support the important missions that the military must perform, but he sees a bipartisan agreement on a ceiling of about $300 billion for defense. A key part of his solution to this problem, similar to one of Conetta's ideas, is to cut back on current modernization in favor of research and development that will truly transform the force in 20 years. Rogue states are not buying advanced systems. Kosiak argued that some force structure will have to be cut today to economize funds, but the nation must invest for an uncertain and dangerous future. He sees this process as part of an historical trend toward smaller and more capital-intensive militaries.
The Big Picture: What Military Strategy Should Be.
Cindy Williams led off the last panel by discussing approaches that she believes should be used to shape the next national military strategy. First, she explained why she disagrees with senior military leaders who want a QDR that is "strategy based, not resource based." They want to be able to list all the missions they have been asked or wish to do, and then let DoD identify the forces and programs that will be necessary to meet those requirements with acceptable risk and calculate the cost to present to Congress. Williams argued that "the essence of grand strategy is setting priorities and making choices among competing interests and missions, precisely when resources are constrained." She doubts that military budgets will grow much in the coming years, anyway, and asserted that force structure and modernization cutbacks are far more likely than large funding increases for defense. The QDR needs to decide what missions are most important and affordable within current spending realities.
Next, Williams attacked the use of two MTWs as a force-sizing principle that has become the centerpiece of declared U.S. military strategy. However, the mismatch between this declaratory strategy and actual operations involving peace operations and shaping missions has caused considerable friction. The forces structured for two MTWs are really not configured for the actual operations of the past decade, causing considerable strain on "high demand, low density" units and personnel types that are used repeatedly, and Cold War-based readiness reports are skewed so that a unit may be declared unready to fight in an MTW, but might be perfectly able to carry out the smaller scale contingency (SSC) it has been assigned by the President. She argued that future military strategy and force structure should be modified to meet the reality of current operations. First priority should be given to a single MTW, with second priority assigned to a force for SSCs. She agreed with Carl Conetta that the military's role in shaping could be done at lower cost and with less risk by civilian institutions and resources, and this would also leave a more peaceful impression of the United States abroad.
Seth Cropsey followed with a presentation that focused on what he perceives as threats to the sense of purpose and direction of the American military. Most of what the United
States has worked to accomplish within the last century is within its grasp, and Cropsey credits much of that success to the ability of its armed services to win wars, while protecting the nation and its allies. However, he is concerned because the idea that a military is maintained for combat is being gradually replaced by "vague notions and social desiderata that confuse everyone in and outside the armed forces about their purpose."
Cropsey mentioned a series of policies that have fueled this trend. After properly cutting force strength after the Cold War, Congress and the Executive Branch have changed the stated purpose of the armed forces by adding a plethora of noncombat roles. Though there are many things right about these missions, he wonders whether the military will be able to maintain its central values while so concentrated on competing ones. There are already signs of erosion. In a recent survey of service members, only 85 percent said they were willing to risk their lives "if necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission." This decline has also been furthered by the military's increasing emphasis on force protection resulting from terrorist events and the executive branch's insistence on zero casualties, a practice that often reduces the effectiveness of the way units fight. Cropsey asked, "Is our military's mission to protect itself or defeat an enemy?" He also perceives the RMA as another "unintentional source of diversion from traditional military values." While it promises great benefits, he sees no one pointing out its negative effects. Precise, standoff weapons encourage leaders to expect that objectives can be achieved without risking military lives, and the armed forces have begun to embrace that idea as well. Junior leaders are becoming frustrated when their judgments are overridden by higher commanders who believe they have the same information as their on-scene subordinates.
Cropsey expressed great concern about the decline of American nuclear deterrence of rogue states. If they launch one or two weapons of mass destruction at the United States, he doubts the nation will retaliate with a mass strike. Instead American leaders would probably try to respond proportionately, but that would still only kill many innocent civilians without harming the dictator responsible. The best alternative would be to have a strong conventional deterrent capable of putting the enemy's whole armed force at risk, a real threat to a small tyrant. But that will require having warriors willing and able to perform that mission. Cropsey closed by stating that the American military should remain focused on fielding the best motivated combat force in the world, and "forget the other stuff."
The last panelist at the conference, Colonel Walter Anderson, agreed that the primary focus for the military should be winning wars, but argued that all the elements of "shape, respond, and prepare" could be accomplished with proper resources. The three elements have synergy that can help mitigate risk, and he predicted that the next national security strategy would not be much different. But without proper funding, the nation is on a glide path to unacceptable levels of risk in meeting American security objectives. The so-called "Peace Dividend" was an illusion, and the United States now finds itself with a "deterrence gap" that places decisionmakers into a consequence management role after a crisis occurs instead of allowing them to prevent it. He described Army efforts to maintain the "legacy force" while developing interim and objective follow-ons, but also noted that the multidimensional challenges facing the armed services will require more capable joint forces as well.
Anderson explained that the "2 MTW" approach is necessary to avoid self-deterrence ("If you have one arrow, when do you fire it?") but pointed out that there is risk written into the current national security strategy that requires those wars to be fought from a posture of engagement. He wondered what the process and impact of pulling out of Bosnia would be. Homeland defense is another area that will require some forces, and those undergoing transformation will not be available for deployment during their period of transition. Despite these requirements, American military forces must still be capable of reassuring allies and deterring threats.
Conclusions.
Concerning the focus of future planning, there appeared to be general agreement at the conference that the possibility of two MTWs has decreased, that there will be more small scale contingencies in the future, and that the United States will retain its advantage in technology and emphasis on minimal casualties for quite a while. There was much less consensus on the next step. Some supported retaining the ability to fight two MTWs despite their reduced probability of occurrence, simply because that represents the most dangerous threat or would cause the worst consequences. Others argued for a restructuring to meet more likely missions, or advocated reducing forces because there is no viable threat to U.S. interests.
Similarly, almost all attendees concurred that there is a need for the American military to change and adapt, and many supported a broad transformation. There was also agreement that even with modest budget increases, continuing fiscal constraints will demand hard choices to establish priorities for defense spending. The closeness of the recent election and precarious balance in Congress portend that there will be no major increases in defense spending during the next administration. Attendees also generally believed the future military strategy will probably remain some form of the current "shape, respond, prepare" construct. But opinions varied widely as to the direction and pace transformation should take, exactly how the defense budget should be spent, and what the proper emphasis for each of the three elements of the new security strategy should be.
While the conference did not achieve anything near consensus on the future course of American military strategy, it did effectively highlight key issues that must be resolved to keep it on the right path. General Zinni's two questions frame important elements of the debate, looking at threats and military capabilities in a very uncertain future. Concerning "Ready for what?" the process of balancing ends, ways, and means in the next decade will be complex and confrontational, involving sincere proponents of a wide range of views. Once decisionmakers have determined the goals they want military forces to accomplish, they must be willing to commit the resources to fund the required capabilities and structure, or else to set global priorities that will prevent overcommitment. Economizing alone will not be enough. Hard choices may have to be made between a focus on shaping or responding, between major wars or peacekeeping, and between a commitment to new technology or maintaining current equipment. As for "What needs to change?" the services face the challenge of achieving meaningful transformation that truly increases capabilities for future missions without raising risk, is within resource constraints, and invests in those technologies that offer the most potential for revolutionary change. In this quest for a new strategy, the costs of failure in either the political or military arena could be catastrophic, resulting in unacceptable risk to the nation and its interests, and the loss of an opportunity to create a "New World Order" reflecting liberal-democratic ideals. GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC (RET.) joined the Marine Corps in 1961 and was commissioned an infantry second lieutenant in 1965 upon his graduation from Villanova University. He has held numerous command and staff assignments that include platoon, company, battalion, regimental, Marine expeditionary unit, and Marine expeditionary force command. His staff assignments include service on battalion, regimental, division, base, and service staffs in operations, training, special operations, counterterrorism, and manpower billets. General Zinni's joint assignments include command of a joint task force and a unified command. He has also had several joint and combined staff billets at task force and unified command levels. His operational experience includes duty in Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Africa among others. He has also participated in presidential diplomatic missions to Somalia, Pakistan, and Ethiopia-Eritrea.
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